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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
For decades, the Rehabilitation Act (RA) and its 
progeny, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), have 
served as twin pillars of federal disability discrimination law.  
Both statutes secure the rights of individuals with disabilities 
to independence and full inclusion in American society and, 
unsurprisingly, have been constant companions in our case law 
as it has developed to effect those rights.  The RA assures 
“meaningful access” to federally funded programs, Alexander 
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985), on the one hand, and the 
ADA provides for “full and equal enjoyment” of public 
accommodations, 42 U.S.C § 12182(a), on the other, to people 
with disabilities.  When necessary to realize that access and 
enjoyment, the statutes require “reasonable accommodations,” 
Choate, 469 U.S. at 301, or “reasonable modifications,” 42 
U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), to be made by actors within the 
statutes’ reach. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has promulgated 
regulations interpreting the ADA’s “reasonable modification” 
requirement to mean that covered actors generally must 
“modify policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of 
a service animal by an individual with a disability,” 28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.302(c)(1); see also id. § 35.136(a), and must “permit[] 
[such individuals] to be accompanied by their service animals 
in all areas of [the covered actor’s facilities] where . . . program 
participants . . . are allowed to go,” id. § 36.302(c)(7); see also 
id. § 35.136(g).  The question presented by this case is one of 
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first impression in the Courts of Appeals: whether, in the 
absence of a similar regulation specifically interpreting the RA, 
its mandate of “reasonable accommodations,” consistent with 
the mandate of “reasonable modifications” under the ADA, 
generally requires that individuals with disabilities be 
permitted to be accompanied by their service animals and, thus, 
renders such requested accommodations per se reasonable in 
the ordinary course.   
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that it does and 
that the District Court’s contrary jury instructions constitute 
reversible error.  Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. Factual Background 
This case centers on an elementary school student with 
dyslexia and epilepsy, M.B., and her rebuffed attempts to be 
accompanied by her service dog to school.  When M.B. was a 
young child, her mother had to monitor her constantly and care 
for her during epileptic seizures, the onset of which could be 
subtle or sudden.  As M.B. grew older and became more 
independent, though, her pediatric neurologist recommended 
that she obtain a service dog to take over this function.1  M.B.’s 
                                              
1 People with epilepsy commonly rely on the functional 
assistance of service dogs to provide care and support and to 
maintain their independence.  Service dogs can be trained to 
detect and respond to seizures, such as by barking to alert the 
family when a child has a seizure while playing in another 
room, and to provide assistance throughout the seizure’s 
duration, such as by lying next to the child to prevent injury.  
See Pub. Interest Law Ctr. Amicus Br. 4. 
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mother therefore arranged to acquire a service dog, which 
accompanied M.B. to school during second grade and helped 
her cope with her epilepsy by alerting during a seizure and 
providing safety and comfort until the seizure had passed. 
In third grade, M.B. switched to the dePaul School,2 
which had a specialized program for dyslexic students.  Before 
enrolling M.B. there, M.B.’s mother met with the principal and 
explained that, in addition to dyslexia, M.B. also had epilepsy 
and that the service dog, who had recently died, had 
accompanied M.B. to her previous school.  M.B.’s mother also 
explained that M.B. was on the waiting list for a new service 
dog that likewise would need to accompany her to school.  
After receiving assurances from the principal that M.B. was a 
“very good fit” for the School, M.B.’s mother enrolled her that 
fall as a third grader.  JA 501. 
That winter, M.B. came off the waiting list and was 
paired with a new service dog, Buddy.  But when M.B.’s 
mother asked the principal for permission to send Buddy to 
school with M.B., the principal refused, asserting for the first 
time that Buddy would be “too much of a distraction” to other 
children.  JA 673.  Because Buddy was not allowed to 
accompany her, M.B. missed the next two weeks of school to 
be with Buddy 24 hours a day for an initial intensive bonding 
period.  And after M.B. returned to school, because the 
principal continued to deny permission for Buddy to 
accompany her throughout the remainder of third grade, Buddy 
was not available to alert school staff during seizure activity or 
                                              
2 Appellee Allied Services Institute of Rehabilitation 
Medicine operates the dePaul School.  We will refer to these 
entities collectively as “the School.” 
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to support her recovery.  As a result, M.B.’s mother kept M.B. 
home when her seizures were more severe. 
In an effort to avoid these interruptions to M.B.’s 
education, M.B.’s mother met with the principal again before 
fourth grade to request that Buddy be permitted to accompany 
M.B. in the new school year.  By that time, Buddy not only 
could alert during M.B.’s seizures, but also could predict and 
alert to them minutes before they even began.  But the principal 
still refused, once more asserting that Buddy might distract 
other students.  Yet again, M.B. attempted to attend without 
Buddy, but that year she missed 65 days of school—more than 
one-third of the school year—with seizure activity accounting 
for about half of her absences. 
A devoted advocate, M.B.’s mother sought permission 
again on the eve of fifth grade for Buddy to accompany M.B. 
to school, pointing out that M.B.’s seizures were increasing in 
frequency, which exacerbated the concerns about her attending 
without Buddy’s assistance.  But again the principal refused, 
citing possible distraction, and so once more M.B. started the 
school year unaccompanied by Buddy.  Without her service 
animal, however, M.B. became anxious and distracted at 
school, afraid of enduring the increased seizure activity.  Her 
mother therefore met again with the principal to renew her 
request for Buddy to accompany M.B. to school and to advise 
the principal that M.B.’s pediatric neurologist had 
recommended that Buddy “should be at school with her.”  JA 
530.  The principal promised to “look into” the request.  JA 
531. 
Unsatisfied with that answer, M.B.’s mother simply 
began bringing Buddy to school with M.B. in the morning.  
Each day she did so, however, the principal stopped them at 
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the entrance of the School and refused to allow Buddy to enter.  
The principal also offered a new explanation: Instead of 
pointing to the possibility of distraction, the principal said she 
had discovered that another student in the School was allergic 
to dogs. 
 At that point, given M.B.’s growing anxiety and 
distraction and the medical risks associated with attending 
school without Buddy, M.B. stayed home from school for more 
than two months while her mother continued her efforts to 
obtain an accommodation from the School.  Those efforts 
included leaving telephone messages, having her attorney send 
letters, and forwarding a note she obtained from M.B.’s 
pediatrician that explained that, because M.B.’s “seizure 
activity has escalated and is not always obvious, it is medically 
necessary for ‘Buddy,’ [her] trained seizure dog, to be with her 
24 hours [a day] / 7 days a week.”  JA 1396.  A teacher at the 
School also provided the principal with an informational article 
about seizure alert dogs that detailed how they are able to 
predict and alert to seizures and give their owners time to move 
to a safe place, take medication, call for help, and notify others 
about the impending seizure for later monitoring.  And the 
parents of the student who was allergic to dogs, for their part, 
informed the principal that they had arranged for allergy 
treatments for their son and did not want M.B. to be excluded 
from the School on his behalf. 
After weeks of back-and-forth effort, the principal 
finally agreed that M.B. could return with Buddy, but only on 
the condition that Buddy at all times wear a special therapeutic 
shirt designed to decrease allergens.  Thus, in January of fifth 
grade, M.B. finally returned to school, this time with Buddy.  
But her return was short-lived.  The special hypo-allergenic 
shirt made Buddy overheated, causing him to pant and to fail 
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to alert or respond when M.B. had seizures.  After two weeks 
of these conditions, M.B.’s mother learned that M.B had slept 
on the floor of the principal’s office for hours after seizing 
without Buddy’s intervention.  The next day, she withdrew 
M.B. from the School permanently. 
Eventually, M.B. was enrolled in the local public 
school, which allowed Buddy to accompany her.  By that point, 
however, M.B.’s testing showed that she had fallen too far 
behind to resume or even to repeat fifth grade.  Instead, she was 
required to enter as a fourth grader. 
II.  Procedural Background 
M.B.’s parents sued the School, asserting that it had 
failed to accommodate M.B. in violation of § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act (RA), Title III of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (PHRA).3  After discovery, the School moved 
for summary judgment on all claims, and the District Court 
granted that motion as to the ADA and PHRA claims. 
Regarding the ADA claim, the Court noted that M.B.’s 
parents only sought damages and explained that damages are 
not an available form of relief under Title III of the ADA.  As 
for the PHRA claim, the District Court summarily stated, “the 
analysis of an ADA claim applies equally to a PHRA claim,” 
JA 23, and dismissed it on that basis. 
                                              
3 M.B.’s parents brought additional state law claims, but 
they do not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of those 
claims on appeal.   
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The District Court then turned to the RA claim.  
Observing that the substantive standard of liability to prove 
discrimination under § 504 of the RA was “materially 
identical” to the standard under the ADA, JA 27 (citation 
omitted), the Court looked for guidance to the DOJ’s 
regulations implementing the ADA, which require that 
“reasonable modifications” be made when necessary to avoid 
disability discrimination, 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(7)(i), 
36.302(a).  It identified two particular ADA regulations 
pertaining to service animals—one applicable to public 
entities, id. § 35.136, and one applicable to public 
accommodations, id. § 36.302.4  In both, the DOJ interprets 
“reasonable modifications” to mean that covered actors “shall 
modify [their] policies, practices, or procedures to permit the 
use of a service animal by an individual with a disability.”  Id. 
§§ 35.136(a), 36.302(c)(1).  Determining that the DOJ’s 
interpretation of the ADA was equally applicable to the RA 
and was therefore “enforceable against [the School] in 
deciding whether it violated federal law,” JA 29, the District 
Court concluded that there were genuine disputes of material 
fact as to whether the School failed to accommodate M.B. 
under the RA and denied its summary judgment motion as to 
that claim.  The parties then proceeded to a jury trial, with the 
District Court continuing to indicate that the ADA service 
animal regulations were controlling by, for example, excluding 
                                              
4 Under Title II of the ADA, “public entities” include all 
programs of state and local governments.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12131(1).  Under Title III, “public accommodations” include 
most places that are generally open to the public, including 
schools.  See id. § 12181(7).  The School concedes that it is a 
public accommodation subject to Title III of the ADA and its 
implementing regulations. 
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testimony from Buddy’s trainer about whether it was 
reasonable for Buddy to wear the hypo-allergenic shirt on the 
ground that “[r]easonableness has already been determined by 
D.O.J. regulations.”  JA 262. 
Three days later, however, the District Court sharply 
reversed course.  First, it disallowed deposition testimony 
about the service animal regulations on the ground that “the 
A.D.A. is not in this case.”  JA 810.  And second, when it came 
time for jury instructions and M.B.’s counsel proposed an 
instruction that mirrored the regulations that the District Court 
had found enforceable at the summary judgment phase,5 the 
Court rejected it, asserting that, at trial, “the standard is 
different.”6  JA 984. 
                                              
5 The “Denial of Use of Service Animal” instruction 
would have read: “The law provides that generally [the School] 
must modify its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the 
use of [M.B.]’s service dog, and [M.B.] must be permitted to 
be accompanied by Buddy in all areas of the [School] where 
students are allowed to go.”  JA 210. 
6 In rejecting the instruction, the District Court also took 
issue with counsel’s mistaken citation to the ADA public entity 
regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.136—which does not apply to the 
School—instead of the materially identical ADA public 
accommodation regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 36.302—which does.  
But as the Court was aware of both regulations and we are 
confident that it sought to advise the jury as to the proper 
standard under the law, we interpret its rejection of the 
proposed instruction to mean that it believed, at that point, that 
the ADA service animal regulations did not bear on the 
interpretation of “reasonable accommodations” under the RA. 
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Instead, the District Court instructed the jury that, to 
prevail on a claim for failure to accommodate, plaintiffs were 
required to “prov[e] by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the requested accommodations” were “reasonable,” and further 
defined that term as meaning “necessary to avoid 
discrimination on the basis of a disability,” or, “[i]n other 
words . . . necessary to permit [M.B.] meaningful 
participation.”  JA 1007.  Only if the plaintiffs proved the 
accommodations were “necessary to avoid discrimination . . . 
on the basis of [M.B.]’s disability,” the Court advised, would 
“the burden shift[] to [the School] to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the requested accommodations were 
unreasonable.”  JA 1008. 
Apparently confused as to how these instructions 
related to the need to accommodate service animals, the jury 
sent the Court a question the same day requesting “up to date 
specific information re: service dogs pertaining to act 
#504/ADA.”  JA 1998.  At that point, M.B.’s counsel again 
urged the Court to instruct the jury on the ADA service animal 
regulations, but the Court again declined, stating that it had 
already “g[iven] them the law that relates to this case” and 
would not “go look for some new law to tell them about or 
some different law or something that’s not been already 
submitted or given to them.”  JA 1089.  The jury then returned 
a verdict for the School. 
M.B.’s parents timely appealed, seeking reversal of the 
dismissal of their PHRA claim as well as a new trial on their 
RA claim on the ground that the District Court did not properly 
instruct the jury on the applicable law. 
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III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the District Court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment, which “is appropriate 
only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Whether jury instructions state the proper legal standard is a 
legal question over which we exercise plenary review.  United 
States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995). 
IV. Analysis 
Focusing primarily on their RA claim, Appellants argue 
that because the substantive standards for liability under the 
RA and the ADA are the same, the service animal regulations 
interpreting “reasonable modifications” under the ADA apply 
equally to “reasonable accommodations” under the RA.  
Therefore, according to Appellants, actors covered by the RA 
must modify their policies to allow for the use of service 
animals by individuals with disabilities to the same extent as 
actors covered by the ADA.  For the reasons we explain below, 
we agree. 
First, we explain why we conclude—based on (1) the 
interplay between the two statutes, (2) case law interpreting 
them to have identical substantive standards of liability, (3) the 
DOJ’s interpretation of the “reasonable modification” 
requirement in the ADA service animal regulations, and (4) 
consonant guidance from the Department of Education (DOE) 
in the RA context—that the “reasonableness” of an 
accommodation or a modification under either statute must be 
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interpreted the same way.  Thus, it constitutes discrimination 
under the RA, to the same extent as under the ADA, to refuse 
to permit disabled individuals to be accompanied by service 
animals.  Second, we address the School’s arguments to the 
contrary.  And finally, we consider the ramifications of our 
holding for the judgment on the RA claim and briefly explain 
why the dismissal of the PHRA claim must be reversed. 
A. The Relationship Between the RA and the 
ADA 
1. Statutory History  
To understand the interplay between the RA’s 
“reasonable accommodation” requirement and the ADA’s 
“reasonable modification” requirement, and therefore to 
determine the relevance of the ADA service animal regulations 
for actors covered by the RA, we must first understand the 
relationship between the two statutes. 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “was the first broad 
federal statute aimed at eradicating discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”  Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 
325, 330 (3d Cir. 1995), as amended (Feb. 2, 1995).  The heart 
of the statute, § 504, established that “[n]o otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or 
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  29 
U.S.C. § 794(a).  This prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of a disability included an affirmative obligation, 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate, that 
“an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be 
provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee 
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offers” and that federally funded programs were required to 
make “reasonable accommodations” or “reasonable 
modifications,” although not “fundamental or substantial” 
ones, when necessary to assure such “meaningful access.”  469 
U.S. at 300–01 (citation omitted); see also Ams. Disabled for 
Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 
1192 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (explaining that Choate 
established under the RA a requirement of “reasonable 
modifications to accommodate the disabled” or a “duty to 
accommodate”). 
After nearly two decades of experience with the statute, 
Congress acknowledged that the RA had “shortcomings and 
deficiencies,” such as “the limited extent of its coverage,” that 
were impeding its effectiveness in eliminating disability 
discrimination.  Helen L., 46 F.3d at 331.  Consequently, in 
1990, Congress enacted the ADA “as a ‘clear and 
comprehensive national mandate’ designed to eliminate 
discrimination against individuals with physical and mental 
disabilities across the United States.”  McGann v. Cinemark 
USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(b)(1)).  “To effectuate its sweeping purpose,” PGA 
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001), Congress 
designed the ADA to fit hand in glove with the RA, leaving 
intact the “scope of protection . . . under the [RA],” Menkowitz 
v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 
1998), but extending its reach beyond federally funded 
programs to three “major areas of public life,” PGA Tour, 532 
U.S. at 675, including employment (Title I), see 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12111–12117; public entities, i.e., state and local 
governments and their programs (Title II), see id. §§ 12131–
12165; and public accommodations (Title III), see id. 
§§ 12181–12189. 
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As relevant here, the extension of these protections in 
Title III to “public accommodations” was the most far-
reaching, as it prohibited discrimination on the basis of a 
disability in “the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
of any place of public accommodation” by its owner or 
operator.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).  In this way, the ADA brought 
within its sweep “the wide variety of establishments available 
to the nondisabled,” PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 677, including 
private schools regardless of whether they receive federal 
funding,7 see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(j). 
Crucially, Title III of the ADA also codified the concept 
of “reasonable accommodations” that the Supreme Court had 
recognized for the RA in Choate.  There, the Court established 
that liability could be premised on a failure to make 
“reasonable accommodations,” a standard that turned on (1) 
whether the requested accommodation to the program was 
“reasonable”; (2) whether it was necessary “to assure 
meaningful access”; and (3) whether it would represent “a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program.”  Choate, 
469 U.S. at 300–01 (citation omitted); see also Ridley Sch. 
Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 280 (3d Cir. 2012) (identifying 
these elements).  Mirroring this language, Congress used the 
same three criteria to define one type of “discrimination” under 
the ADA as: 
[1] a failure to make reasonable modifications in 
policies, practices, or procedures, when [2] such 
                                              
7 Title III also extended to such publicly accessible 
entities as hotels, restaurants, retail stores, movie theaters, 
parks, and gymnasiums.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). 
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modifications are necessary to afford such 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations to individuals 
with disabilities, unless [3] the entity can 
demonstrate that making such modifications 
would fundamentally alter the nature of such 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations. 
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).   
Also of note, although Congress here used the term 
“reasonable modifications,” it used the term “reasonable 
accommodations” elsewhere in the ADA without apparent 
distinction.  While Titles II and III defined discrimination to 
include the failure to make “reasonable modifications,” id. 
§§ 12131(2), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), Title I, which applied to 
employers, defined “discrimination” to include “not making 
reasonable accommodations,” id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  See 
Robertson v. Las Animas Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 
1195 n.8 (10th Cir. 2007) (observing that “Title II’s use of the 
term ‘reasonable modifications’ is essentially equivalent to 
Title I’s use of the term ‘reasonable accommodation[s]’”); 
accord McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 640 n.2 
(2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “courts use the terms ‘reasonable 
modifications’ in Title II and ‘reasonable accommodations’ in 
Title I interchangeably”) (collecting cases). 
Shortly after enacting the ADA, Congress also 
undertook to amend the RA “to ensure that the precepts and 
values embedded in the [ADA] [we]re reflected in the [RA],” 
S. Rep. No. 102-357, at 2 (1992), to specify “congressional 
findings, purpose, and policy” for the RA, id. at 14, and to 
“reaffirm[] . . . the precepts of the [ADA]”—intending such 
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principles to “guide the policies, practices, and procedures 
developed under all titles of the [RA],” id.  To those ends, 
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344 (codified as amended in 
various sections of Title 29), which set forth certain threshold 
findings, purposes, and policy applicable to the entire act, 
echoing the ADA.   
As a result, the RA, like the ADA, recognizes that 
disabilities do not diminish the right to full inclusion in 
American society.  Compare 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(3)(F) (finding 
that “disability . . .  in no way diminishes the right of 
individuals” to “enjoy full inclusion and integration” in the 
“mainstream of American society”), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(1) (finding that “disabilities in no way diminish a 
person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society”).  
Both statutes aim to secure “full participation.”  Compare 29 
U.S.C. § 701(c)(3) (affirming the principles of “inclusion, 
integration, and full participation”), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(7) (seeking “to assure equality of opportunity” and 
“full participation”).  And both statutes target the same “critical 
areas” where discrimination persists, including education.  
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(5) (finding that “individuals with 
disabilities continually encounter various forms of 
discrimination” in eleven “critical areas,” including 
education), with 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (finding that 
“discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists” 
in the same eleven “critical areas”). 
This history teaches that both statutes “aim to root out 
disability-based discrimination, enabling each covered person 
(sometimes by means of reasonable accommodations) to 
participate equally to all others,” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 
 18 
 
137 S. Ct. 743, 756 (2017),8 and their requirements of 
“reasonable accommodations” and “reasonable modifications” 
are inextricably intertwined.  As a general rule, “repetition of 
the same language in a new statute indicates . . . the intent to 
incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.”  Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998).  And here, the terms 
“reasonable accommodations” and “reasonable modifications” 
were used interchangeably in RA case law, see Choate, 469 
U.S. at 300–01; cf. Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 409–
10, 412–13 (1979) (employing similar variations); Congress 
then codified the requirements of Choate in the ADA,9 42 
U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); and Congress itself used the terms 
“reasonable modifications” and “reasonable accommodations” 
in the ADA without apparent distinction, see Robertson, 500 
F.3d at 1195 n.8; McElwee, 700 F.3d at 640 n.2.  We conclude 
that, although the statutes may diverge as to the entities they 
                                              
8 Although the Supreme Court in Fry was comparing 
the RA to Title II of the ADA, applicable to public entities, 137 
S. Ct. at 756, “all three titles [of the ADA] have similar 
purposes, that is, to eliminate discrimination in the sphere each 
one covers,” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 346 
F.3d 402, 433 (3d Cir. 2003). 
9 See Katie Eyer, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 Yale L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 271, 304 (2005) (describing the “reasonable 
modification” requirement as “a component of the 
requirements of § 504 [of the RA] that was well established by 
case law prior to the passage of the ADA”); see also Wis. Corr. 
Serv. v. City of Milwaukee, 173 F. Supp. 2d 842, 849 (E.D. 
Wis. 2001) (recognizing that the ADA’s “reasonable 
modification” requirement is “[c]onsistent with case law under 
the [RA]”). 
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cover and remedies they provide, they impose the same 
substantive liability standard and require a unified approach to 
the “reasonableness” of accommodations and modifications. 
2. Case Law 
Our conclusion that the RA and the ADA apply the 
same standard of reasonableness is further compelled by the 
body of case law interpreting the two statutes. 
To begin, when a plaintiff sues under both the RA and 
the ADA, we often “address both claims in the same breath,” 
Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 
587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing summary 
judgment as to both RA and ADA claims), “constru[ing] the 
provisions of [both statutes] in light of their close similarity of 
language and purpose,” Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of 
Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 406 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation 
omitted); accord Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 
223–24 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (recognizing that, as the 
statutes “generally are interpreted in pari materia,” its “holding 
applie[d] to both”).  Although we may depart from this 
approach on questions of reach and remedies, we generally 
apply “the same standard for determination of liability,” 
Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 
2012); accord S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 
729 F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2013); Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 
703 F.3d 441, 447–51 (8th Cir. 2013), in recognition that “the 
scope of protection afforded” under both statutes, i.e., the 
“general prohibition[] against discrimination,” is materially the 
same, Menkowitz, 154 F.3d at 120. 
An essential feature of this “prohibition against 
discrimination” is, of course, the duty to make “reasonable 
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accommodations” and “reasonable modifications,” and while 
we have not explicitly held that those terms are synonymous, 
we have assumed as much.  See Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 
170, 181 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) (using the phrases “reasonable 
accommodations” and “reasonable modifications” 
interchangeably as to the ADA); Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1192 
(describing the RA as requiring “reasonable modifications to 
accommodate the disabled” or a “duty to accommodate”).   
The Supreme Court has done the same.  For example, in 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, the precursor to 
Choate, the Court discussed as actionable under the RA both 
the “refusal to modify” and the “refusal to accommodate,” 442 
U.S. at 413, and in Choate itself, the Court referenced both 
“reasonable accommodations” and “reasonable 
modifications,” 469 U.S. at 300–01.  Likewise, the Court has 
recognized that the RA operates “[i]n [a] similar vein” to the 
ADA, requiring “certain ‘reasonable’ modifications to existing 
practices in order to ‘accommodate’ persons with disabilities.”  
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (quoting Choate, 469 U.S. at 299–300). 
Other Courts of Appeals also have recognized that 
“[a]lthough Title III of the ADA uses the term ‘reasonable 
modification[s]’ rather than ‘reasonable accommodation[s],’ 
these terms do not differ in the standards they create.”  
Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (citation and alteration omitted); see also Nunes v. 
Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 145 n.6 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(stating that “there is no material difference between the 
terms”); Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 
454, 462 n.5 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that “[t]he standard for 
reasonableness under the ADA does not differ from the one 
employed under the [RA]” and therefore analyzing failure to 
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accommodate claims under both statutes together (quoting 
Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1083)).10 
In short, the case law reinforces the conclusion we draw 
from the statutes’ intertwined histories: The reasonableness of 
an accommodation or modification is the same under the RA 
and the ADA.  Accordingly, while the text of the RA does not, 
by itself, resolve whether accommodating the use of service 
animals by individuals with disabilities is generally reasonable, 
it is appropriate to consider the regulations and guidance 
applicable to the ADA’s “reasonable modification” 
                                              
10 In the context of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), courts 
do distinguish between “reasonable accommodations” and 
“reasonable modifications.”  See Hollis v. Chestnut Bend 
Homeowners Ass’n, 760 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding 
that a “disabled individual alleging unlawful housing 
discrimination” can rely on either “failure to make a reasonable 
accommodation . . . or failure to permit a reasonable 
modification”).  But that is because the FHA specifically 
defines discrimination to include both “a refusal to permit, at 
the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable 
modifications of existing premises,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(A), and, separately, “a refusal to make reasonable 
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,” id. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(B).  The FHA thus uses “modification” and 
“accommodation” as terms of art, in sharp contrast to the 
provisions of the ADA applicable here, where “use of the term 
‘reasonable modifications’ is essentially equivalent to . . . use 
of the term ‘reasonable accommodation[s].’”  Robertson, 500 
F.3d at 1195 n.8.  
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requirement in answering that question.  With these principles 
in mind, we turn to the ADA service animal regulations. 
3. The Service Animal Regulations 
A year after the ADA’s enactment, the DOJ, its 
administering agency, promulgated a regulation that made 
accommodation of the use of service animals generally 
reasonable under the “reasonable modification” requirement.  
See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,565 (July 26, 1991).  This 
regulation, which applied only to public accommodations 
under Title III, imported the “reasonable modifications” 
language from the text of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), and further provided that public 
accommodations “[g]enerally . . . shall modify policies, 
practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal 
by an individual with a disability,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(1) 
(1992).   
Two decades later, the DOJ spoke to the subject again.  
Recognizing that “there [was] no specific language in the 1991 
title II regulation [applicable to public entities] concerning 
service animals,” 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,191 (Sept. 15, 2010), 
the DOJ promulgated a regulation for that context, using 
materially identical language to provide that a public entity 
“[g]enerally . . . shall modify its policies, practices, or 
procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an 
individual with a disability,” 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(a).   
As the court observed in Alboniga v. School Board, 87 
F. Supp. 3d 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2015), in an exceptionally careful 
and thorough analysis of how these regulations inform the 
“reasonableness” of proposed modifications under the ADA, 
the service animal regulations are “consistent with and a 
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specific application of” the “reasonable modification” 
requirement.  Id. at 1335.  They “present[] the DOJ’s holistic 
view, in enforcing the ADA, of when it is reasonable, and when 
it is unreasonable, to require public entities [and 
accommodations] to accommodate the use of service animals.”  
Id. at 1336.   
On the one hand, they establish the “general rule” that 
requiring covered actors to make modifications to permit the 
use of service animals is reasonable.  Id.; see Johnson v. 
Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1060 (5th Cir. 
1997) (concluding that plaintiff had satisfied his initial burden 
of establishing the requested modification was “reasonable 
generally or in the run of cases” and the burden then shifted to 
the defendant because “[t]he regulation and commentary 
reflect an administrative determination that modifying a no 
animals policy to allow a service animal full access with its 
owner in a place of public accommodation is generally 
reasonable”).   
On the other hand, they specify the limited 
circumstances in which it would be unreasonable to require 
these actors to allow the use of service animals: if granting 
access would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the program, 
28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(7), 36.302(a), or pose a “direct threat” 
to the health or safety of others, id. §§ 35.139, 36.208, or if the 
animal is either “out of control” or “not housebroken,”11 id. 
                                              
11 The definition of a “service animal” also incorporates 
certain limitations, as it means “any dog that is individually 
trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an 
individual with a disability,” such as by “assisting an 
individual during a seizure.”  28 C.F.R §§ 35.104, 36.104. 
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§§ 35.136(b)(1)–(2), 36.302(c)(2)(i)–(ii); see also id. pt. 35, 
app. A, §§ 35.104, 35.136 (illustrating application of these 
exceptions with specific examples).  Subject to these 
exceptions, however, the regulations mandate that 
“[i]ndividuals with disabilities shall be permitted to be 
accompanied by their service animals in all areas of [a covered 
actor’s facilities] where . . . program participants . . . are 
allowed to go.”  Id. § 36.302(c)(7); see also id. § 35.136(g). 
Put differently, if the exceptions are inapplicable, a 
disabled individual’s proposed accommodation of the use of 
her service animal is reasonable under the ADA as a matter of 
law.  See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1064 (affirming plaintiff’s 
verdict following bench trial because defendant failed to 
accommodate his use of a service animal and, in view of the 
service animal regulations and commentary, defendant was 
required to make such modifications “unless it c[ould] 
demonstrate either 1) that such modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the public accommodation or 
2) that such modifications would jeopardize the safety of the 
public accommodation”); Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 
(granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the ground 
that, where no exception applied, plaintiff’s request for the 
accommodation of her service animal was necessarily 
“reasonable within the meaning of the regulations 
implementing the ADA”); cf. Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 
429 (7th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that “a deaf individual’s need 
for the accommodation afforded by a hearing dog” is “per se 
reasonable within the meaning of the [Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988]”). 
The exclusivity of these exceptions is apparent not only 
in the language and structure of the regulations—to which we 
accord Chevron deference unless “arbitrary, capricious or 
 25 
 
manifestly contrary to the statute,” Helen L., 46 F.3d at 332 
(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)); see Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1060–61 
(concluding the ADA service animal regulations warrant 
Chevron deference); Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1333–37 
(same)—but also as confirmed by the DOJ itself in interpreting 
its regulations, an interpretation to which we must defer 
“unless . . . ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation,’” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 
208 (2011) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 
(1997)).  In the Statement of Interest it filed in Alboniga, the 
DOJ explained that the service animal regulations “reflect the 
Department’s regulatory judgment that requiring [covered 
actors] to make modifications to permit the use of service 
animals generally is reasonable, subject to specific, 
enumerated exceptions.”  Statement of Interest of the United 
States at 10, Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (No. 14-CIV-
60085).  And that position is consistent with the DOJ’s 
technical assistance, amicus briefs, and enforcement efforts 
over at least the past decade.  See id. at 5 n.5 (collecting 
authorities).  So interpreted, the regulations fulfill Congress’s 
intent to ensure “the broadest feasible access be provided to 
service animals in all places of public accommodation”—
permitting their exclusion only “in rare circumstances.”  28 
C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, § 36.302; see id. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.136.   
When we consider these observations against the 
backdrop of our earlier discussion concerning the equivalence 
of “reasonable modifications” and “reasonable 
accommodations,” logic dictates that the service animal 
regulations, although technically interpreting the ADA, are no 
less relevant to the interpretation of the RA.  In the latter 
context too, the general rule—subject to the same exceptions—
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is that a grantee must “modify policies, practices, or procedures 
to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a 
disability,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(1), and must “permit[] [such 
individuals] to be accompanied by their service animals in all 
areas of [the grantee’s facilities] where . . . program 
participants . . . are allowed to go,” id. § 36.302(c)(7).  And just 
as in the ADA context, where no exception applies, the 
accommodation of such individuals’ use of service animals is 
per se reasonable.  Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1064; Alboniga, 87 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1344; cf. Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429. 
4. Consonant Agency Guidance 
Our holding today also finds support in the regulations 
and informal guidance of other agencies across the landscape 
of disability law.   
The DOE, which implements the RA as it applies to 
educational institutions, see generally 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, has 
indicated in informal guidance that the accommodation of a 
disabled student’s request to be accompanied by her service 
animal generally should be deemed reasonable.  Specifically, 
in response to an inquiry about whether barring service dogs 
from a classroom violated the RA, the DOE stated—without 
indicating that any additional showing of “reasonableness” was 
required—that “if not allowing a student to bring a service dog 
into the classroom would effectively deny the student the 
opportunity . . . to participate in or benefit from the education 
program,” i.e., if necessity were satisfied, “then the recipient 
school would be in violation of Section 504 [of the RA] and its 
implementing regulation.”12  Letter from Michael L. Williams, 
                                              
12 The DOE has promulgated a general regulation 
providing that federally funded schools may not deny 
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Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 17 Educ. 
Handicapped L. Rep. 1027, 1027 (1991).  In its administrative 
adjudications, the DOE has taken a similar position.13     
For its part, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) has indicated that the RA may impose 
even greater obligations as to service animals than its ADA 
                                              
individuals with disabilities “the opportunity to participate in 
or benefit from the[ir] aid, benefit, or service.”  34 C.F.R. 
§ 104.4(b)(1)(i).  It has also advised informally that such 
schools have an obligation to make “reasonable 
modifications,” which “applies under both Section 504 and 
[the ADA],” and that it views the terms “reasonable 
accommodation and reasonable modification 
interchangeably.”  U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, 
Frequently Asked Questions About the Rights of Students with 
Disabilities in Public Charter Schools Under Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, at 14 n.53, 19 & n.65 (2016) 
(emphasis omitted), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/docs/dcl-faq-201612-504-charter-school.pdf.   
13 See, e.g., Ketchum Pub. Sch., Case No. 07-17-1250 
(U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Feb. 12, 2018) (resolution agreement), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations
/more/07171250-b.pdf (requiring a school district to revise its 
service animal policy to comply with both statutes); Letter 
from Melanie Velez, Reg’l Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office 
for Civil Rights, to Shane Barnett, Superintendent, Cullman 
Cty. Sch. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/04171114-a.pdf 
(finding that evidence of a school district’s noncompliance 
with the service animal regulations was also sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of noncompliance with the RA). 
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counterpart.  In a notice regarding the obligations of housing 
providers under the Fair Housing Act and the RA, HUD 
explained that the ADA service animal regulations’ limited 
definition of “service animal”14 “does not limit housing 
providers’ obligations to make reasonable accommodations for 
assistance animals under . . . Section 504 [of the RA].”  U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Service Animals and Assistance 
Animals for People with Disabilities in Housing and HUD-
Funded Programs 1 (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/SERVANIMALS_NT
CFHEO2013-01.PDF.  Rather, HUD explained, so long as an 
individual has a “disability-related need for an assistance 
animal,” “[s]ection 504 require[s] the housing provider to 
modify or provide an exception to a ‘no pets’ rule or policy” in 
order “to permit a person with a disability to live with and use 
an assistance animal(s) in all areas of the premises where 
persons are normally allowed to go, unless doing so would 
impose an undue financial and administrative burden or would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the housing provider’s 
services.”  Id. at 3. 
Finally, two other agencies, in the exercise of their rule-
making authority, have interpreted the RA to require 
accommodation of the use of service animals.  In 2016, the 
Department of Labor (DOL) promulgated a regulation 
materially identical to the DOJ’s service animal regulations, 
providing that a recipient of certain federal workforce 
development funds “shall modify its policies, practices, or 
procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an 
individual with a disability” unless the animal is “out of 
                                              
14 See supra note 11. 
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control” or “not housebroken.”15  29 C.F.R. § 38.16(a), (b)(1)–
(2).  Likewise, a Department of Transportation (DOT) 
regulation, promulgated in 2010 for “[t]he purpose of . . . 
carry[ing] out the [ADA] and Section 504 of the [RA] with 
respect to passenger vessels,” 49 C.F.R. § 39.1, established that 
vessel owners and operators “must permit service animals to 
accompany passengers with a disability . . . in all locations that 
passengers can use on a vessel, including in lifeboats,” id. 
§ 39.91(a)–(b).  Another DOT regulation similarly requires 
airports to establish “relief areas for service animals that 
accompany passengers” with disabilities.  Id. § 27.71(h). 
The relevant agencies are thus unanimous in mandating 
that covered actors, as a general matter, accommodate the use 
of service animals by disabled individuals under both the RA 
and ADA, i.e., such an accommodation generally will be 
reasonable as a matter of law.  And even though 
“[r]esponsibility for administering the [RA] was not delegated 
to a single agency” so that Chevron deference may not be due 
                                              
15 This regulation was promulgated pursuant to the 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, which requires 
that the DOL ensure federal funds are disbursed consistent with 
various anti-discrimination statutes, including the RA.  The 
agency’s responses to comments in the rule-making process 
also reflect its view that “[t]he final rule [requiring reasonable 
modifications] creates no new obligations for recipients 
regarding reasonable accommodations and modifications that 
were not already required by existing laws.  Accommodations 
in the rule parallel those already required under the ADA and 
Section 504 of the [RA], as well as those that were required 
under the [previous] rules.”  81 Fed. Reg. 87,130, 87,171 (Dec. 
2, 2016). 
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to all agency interpretations, it is nonetheless the case that “the 
well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing [this] 
statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment 
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.’”  Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642 (quoting Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944)). 
B. The School’s Counter-Arguments 
Notwithstanding the weight of this authority, the School 
contends that “reasonable accommodations” under the RA 
should not be interpreted consistently with the ADA service 
animal regulations.  We do not find its arguments persuasive. 
As a threshold matter, the School does not question the 
validity of the service animal regulations or dispute that they 
constitute reasonable interpretations of the ADA’s prohibition 
of discriminatory practices—including the failure to make 
reasonable modifications—to which we accord Chevron 
deference.  Nor could it, because the service animal 
regulations, as we have explained, see supra Section IV.A.3, 
clearly “promote[] the statute’s overarching goals of ensuring 
equal opportunity for, and full participation by, individuals 
with disabilities,” Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1334; see also 
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (citing to Alboniga as a case that 
“requir[ed] an accommodation to permit use of a service 
animal” under the ADA). 
Instead, the School points out that the DOJ’s service 
animal regulations technically apply only to claims for 
“reasonable modifications” under the ADA.  We do not 
disagree: The service animal regulations do not purport to 
interpret the RA per se.  But, as we have explained, because 
the statutes’ substantive standards of liability are identical and 
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because “reasonable accommodations” under the RA must be 
interpreted consistently with “reasonable modifications” under 
the ADA, see supra Section IV.A.1–2, the ADA service animal 
regulations necessarily inform our interpretation of the RA.   
The School also contends that, even if the service 
animal regulations are otherwise applicable, the unique needs 
of the education context warrant an exception to avoid 
imposing “strict liability” on schools that are not equipped to 
accommodate service animals.  Appellee’s Br. 20.  Congress, 
however, has given no indication that the use of service 
animals should be less accommodated in the school setting 
than in other settings covered by the RA or the ADA.  To the 
contrary, it made a specific finding in the RA that “individuals 
with disabilities continually encounter various forms of 
discrimination in such critical areas as . . . education,” 29 
U.S.C. § 701(a)(5), just as it did in the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(a)(3).  It also instructed that “all programs, projects, 
and activities receiving assistance . . . shall be carried out in a 
manner consistent with the principles of . . . inclusion, 
integration, and full participation.”  29 U.S.C. § 701(c), (c)(3) 
(emphasis added).  We therefore decline to depart from our 
usual rule of construing anti-discrimination statutes such as the 
RA to “comport[] with th[eir] broad remedial purposes,” Buck 
v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 
2006)—purposes that would be critically undermined if we 
interpreted the RA to permit a school’s exclusion of service 
animals for the very students who cannot meaningfully access 
educational benefits without them.  
As for strict liability, claims alleging failure to 
accommodate under the RA involve the same tripartite inquiry 
as those under the ADA: (1) whether the requested 
accommodation is reasonable; (2) whether it is necessary; and 
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(3) whether it would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
program.  Compare Choate, 469 U.S. at 300–01 (RA), with 
PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 683 n.38 (ADA).  The service animal 
regulations inform only one of those inquiries, reasonableness, 
and do not dispense with the other two.  See PGA Tour, 532 
U.S. at 682 (affirming that “an accommodation might be 
reasonable but not necessary”); Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1192 
(explaining that while some “modifications may be necessary 
to avoid discrimination,” more “substantial modifications are 
not required by [the RA]”).  Any mandate imposed by the 
service animal regulations is also subject to specified 
conditions and exceptions.  E.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.136(b)(1)–
(2), 36.302(c)(2)(i)–(ii).  Applying their logic to schools under 
the RA thus hardly ushers in an era of unrestrained liability. 
The upshot of our analysis—including the statutory 
histories, case law, and DOJ and other agency guidance—is 
that, under the RA, just as under the ADA, a covered actor 
ordinarily must accommodate the use of service animals by 
individuals with disabilities.  As a result, although as a general 
matter the “reasonableness” of an accommodation under the 
RA “must be decided on a case-by-case basis,” Nathanson v. 
Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991), the 
accommodation of a disabled person’s request to be 
accompanied by her service animal—absent exceptional 
circumstances—is per se reasonable, see Johnson, 116 F.3d at 
1064; Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.  And if necessity is 
then also established, so is liability.  See Choate, 469 U.S. at 
300–01; Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1192. 
C. Application to This Case 
We now turn to Appellants’ contention that, in view of 
the RA’s requirement of a “reasonable accommodation” 
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concerning service animals, the District Court did not correctly 
instruct the jury on the applicable law.  The jury instructions 
stated that, for a claim under the RA for failure to 
accommodate, “the plaintiffs have the initial burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested 
accommodations they seek were reasonable.  That is, necessary 
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.  In other 
words, the requested accommodations were necessary to 
permit [M.B.] meaningful participation.”  JA 1007.  The jury 
was further instructed that only if it found that plaintiffs had 
met that burden would “the burden shift[] to [the School] to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested 
accommodations were unreasonable.”  JA 1008. 
These instructions were flawed for two reasons.  First, 
they advised the jury that M.B.’s parents had the initial burden 
to prove their requested accommodation was reasonable 
when—in view of the service animal regulations and the fact 
that no exception to the regulations’ mandate was invoked by 
the School, let alone appears applicable16—their requested 
                                              
16 The School did not suggest, for example, that 
allowing Buddy to accompany M.B. would “fundamentally 
alter the nature of the . . . program,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a), or 
that Buddy was “out of control” or “not housebroken,” id. 
§ 36.302(c)(2)(i)–(ii).  Indeed, the only explanations it offered 
for refusing to make that accommodation were perplexing and 
evolving, including the possibility that students would find 
Buddy distracting, when it would seem the prospect of their 
classmate seizing without advance warning would be far more 
of a distraction, and the allergies of another student, when that 
student’s parents disavowed the need for Buddy’s exclusion 
and that very ground—in guidance applicable to the School as 
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accommodation was reasonable as a matter of law.  See supra 
Section IV.A.3.  Second, the instructions conflated the RA’s 
requirement that the accommodation be reasonable with its 
separate and distinct requirement that the accommodation be 
necessary.  See PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 682; cf. Third Circuit 
Model Civil Jury Instructions § 9.1.3 (Mar. 2018) (instructing 
the jury, in the ADA employment discrimination context, to 
make distinct findings that the defendant “was informed of the 
need for an accommodation” and that “the accommodation(s) 
in dispute . . . would have been reasonable”).  The jury thus 
was not properly instructed. 
Our inquiry does not end there, however.  The School 
urges us to affirm on the alternative ground that the erroneous 
jury instructions were harmless, that is, “that there is a ‘high 
probability’ that the error did not prejudice [Appellants’] 
substantive rights.”  Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 
210, 216 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting McQueeney v. Wilmington Tr. 
Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924 (3d Cir. 1985)).  Specifically, the 
School contends there is a high probability that the jury ruled 
in its favor because it could not, on this record, have made a 
finding of necessity. 
Having carefully reviewed the record, we cannot agree.  
To the contrary, there was compelling evidence before the jury 
that having Buddy accompany M.B. was indeed necessary to 
provide “meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee 
                                              
a “public accommodation” under the ADA—had been deemed 
“not valid” as a reason for “denying access . . . to people using 
service animals,” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., 
Service Animals (July 12, 2011), https://www.ada.gov/
service_animals_2010.htm. 
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offer[ed],” Choate, 469 U.S. at 301, that is, in the education 
context, to ensure “meaningful participation in educational 
activities and meaningful access to educational benefits,” 
Ridley Sch. Dist., 680 F.3d at 280.  And while a plaintiff “may 
not insist on a particular accommodation if another reasonable 
accommodation was offered,” Third Circuit Model Civil Jury 
Instructions § 9.1.3, such an alternative, in order to defeat 
necessity and serve as a defense, also must provide that 
“meaningful access,” Choate, 469 U.S. at 301. 
By that measure, the alternatives offered by the School 
fell woefully short.  With the assistance of school staff alone 
and in the absence of Buddy’s therapeutic services, M.B. was 
subjected to additional safety risks, such as the onset of 
seizures without prior notice, hours of lying in the principal’s 
office without intervention, and significant increased anxiety 
that medical providers indicated was contributing to increased 
seizure activity.  Ultimately, M.B. had such a gaping 
educational deficit that she could not even qualify in the public 
school system to repeat fifth grade, regressing instead to the 
fourth.  The record also indicates that the alternative of having 
Buddy wear the hypo-allergenic shirt—of dubious purpose 
after the allergic student’s parents advised the principal they 
had arranged for allergy treatments and did not want M.B. 
excluded from the School on their son’s behalf—caused Buddy 
to fail to respond when M.B. had seizures.  In any event, as the 
DOJ has interpreted its service animal regulations, “[a]llergies 
and fear of dogs are not valid reasons for denying access or 
refusing service to people using service animals,” U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Service Animals (July 12, 2011), 
https://www.ada.gov/service_animals_2010.htm, and that 
guidance, like the ADA service animal regulation itself, was 
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fully applicable to the School as a “public accommodation” 
under the ADA, see supra note 4.  
Bearing in mind this record and the jury’s own question 
seeking “specific information re: service dogs pertaining to act 
#504/ADA,” JA 1998, the School has hardly shown a “high 
probability” that the jury would have ruled in its favor if 
properly instructed.  To the contrary, it is hard pressed to show 
that any reasonable jury, properly instructed, could so rule.17  
We therefore will vacate and remand for the District Court to 
determine whether there is any remaining genuine issue of 
material fact concerning the School’s liability or whether, in 
view of our holding today, trial should be limited to the matter 
of damages. 
Finally, we briefly address the dismissal of the PHRA 
claim, which we will reverse.  The District Court observed that 
“the analysis of an ADA claim applies equally to a PHRA 
claim,” JA 23, which is true as far as it goes, see Taylor v. 
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999).  But 
it then dismissed both claims on the ground that M.B.’s parents 
                                              
17 We also note that where, as here, a trial judge rules 
early in litigation that a rule of law applies to the facts of the 
case, and that ruling shapes the course of trial and the parties’ 
strategy, but then the judge reverses course at the jury 
instruction stage, there may be a risk of prejudice to the parties 
under the law of the case doctrine.  See In re Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 2009).  
We need not consider whether M.B. suffered such prejudice 
here, however, because our conclusions that the jury 
instructions were erroneous and that the error was not harmless 
dictate our disposition. 
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could not obtain damages under the ADA.  The problem is that, 
while the liability standard for the PHRA and the ADA is the 
same, the remedies are not: The PHRA expressly permits suits 
for damages.  See 43 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 962(c)(3).  
Although we nonetheless could affirm if remand would be 
futile, see Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 264–65 (3d 
Cir. 2005), it would not be in this case.  Even aside from the 
significance of the ADA service animal regulations for the 
PHRA, see Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306–07 (discussing an ADA 
regulation as to a PHRA claim), the PHRA in its own right 
prohibits public accommodations from “deny[ing] . . . any 
person due to use of a guide or support animal because of the . 
. . physical handicap of the user” any of their 
“accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges,” 43 Pa. 
Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 955(i)(1).  It was therefore 
reversible error to dismiss Appellants’ PHRA claim. 
V. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
on the RA claim, reverse the dismissal of the PHRA claim, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
